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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11	COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE			
12	J.K. PROPERTIES, INC.	Case No. RIC 461032		
13	Plaintiff,			
14	vs.	DESDONSE TO DI AINITIEE AND		
15	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL	) RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF AND ) CROSS-DEFENDANT, J.K. ) PROPERTIES, INC.'S AMENDED ) OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE		
16	Defendants.	) OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE		
17		) _)		
18 19	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL,	Time: 8:30 Dept: 7		
20	Cross-complainant,	}		
21	VS.	{		
22	J.K. PROPERTIES, INC.,			
23	Cross-defendants.	{		
24		_ /		
25	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>			
26	Defendant and Cross-Complainan	t Church of Scientology International herewith		
27	files Response to plaintiff/cross-defendant J.K. Properties' <b>AMENDED</b> Objections to Evidence. J.K. has objected to virtually every piece of evidence presented by the Church			
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	II	1		

with frivolous boilerplate objections. It is one thing to make objections with arguable merit and to defend the objection and give *some* basis for it. But J.K. does neither. Rather, it makes boilerplate claims accompanied otherwise by silence, requiring the Church to argue each. The objections are also quite different from the initial objections, thus requiring this second formal response.

For example, J.K. objects on foundational grounds to the introduction of numerous exhibits which its own president, Anil Mehta, authenticated at his deposition, and which it produced in discovery, constituting letters sent from J.K.'s attorney to Church counsel. It also objects to all letters sent from the Church to J.K. which it conceded were received, and are the basis for its own defenses in the Cross-complaint.

J.K. relies upon many of the same exhibits it objects to, while not disputing the significance of the exhibits argued by the Church in the motion for summary judgment.

J.K. also consistently objects to deposition testimony of its own principals and agents on the grounds that it is "irrelevant" or "contains settlement discussions." Yet not a single admission from any purported "settlement discussion" is offered by the Church and no objection was made during any deposition to that effect. And, J.K. does not identify what is allegedly objectionable as having been adduced in a settlement discussion, nor does J.K. state how or why these would be objectionable.

Moreover, prior to J.K.'s filing of its unlawful detainer complaint, there were a number of communications between the parties in an attempt to resolve this matter before having to resort to the courts. J.K.'s claim for damages is based in major part upon an assertion that an "agreement" somehow arose out of these discussions – while at the same time it seeks to exclude all such communications about this purported agreement as "settlement." The objection is frivolous.

J.K. also inanely asserts boilerplate objections to virtually all evidence as irrelevant and immaterial to the central issues which J.K. itself has raised in this case.

In short, the objections constitute inapplicable generalities and pointless makework. All objections should be overruled.

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Please note that J.K.'s Amended objections have omitted many of the frivolous jections set forth in its initial set of objections, such as complaints that deposition stimony was out of context; that testimony of its principals is not admissible against it; e inaccurate assertion that Mr. Mehta was not provided an interpreter; and others. As prior objections are presumably no longer at issue, such prior objections will not be dressed herein.

# RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS

#### Exhibit A - Declaration of Catherine Fraser

# Objection No. 1

Page 1, line 9. "... which makes and distributes religious films and lectures." his statement by Ms. Fraser is relevant because it simply identifies who the fendant/cross-complainant is and what it does. J.K. leased apartments to a religious ganization for its staff members. That fact is relevant.

# Objection No. 2

Page 1, lines 19-21 and Exhibit F to Motion for Summary Judgment. "On August 2006, Golden Era provided a 90-day notice to Anza and Excel that it was vacating the maining 53 units in the apartment complex. (A true and correct copy is appended ereto as Exhibit F.)" Ms. Fraser's declaration sets forth her personal knowledge to state at a legal notice letter was sent on August 7, 2006 on behalf of the Church division, olden Era Productions ("Golden Era"), giving notice that it would vacate the premises at sue and to authenticate the letter sent, by stating therein:

> 1. I make the following statements of my own personal knowledge and if called to testify thereto, could and would do so competently.

> 2. I am and have been an employee of the Church of Scientology International, Golden Era Productions division for more than 10 years. My responsibilities include corporate and legal matters for Golden Era Productions.

Ms. Fraser properly authenticates documents in this paragraph reflecting acts

undertaken by her personally or at her specific direction and control. "A writing may be authenticated by anyone who saw the writing made or executed, including a subscribing witness." Evidence Code §1413. Testimony from a percipient witness, speaking from personal knowledge as to the execution of a writing, is sufficient. *People v. Estrada* (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 76, 100, 155 Cal.Rptr. 731.

The objection is frivolous make-work, because the *verified* unlawful detainer Complaint in this action alleges the identical fact to which J.K. here objects - that the Church gave notice to leave but did not. (See Complaint, ¶7(a).) Indeed, that is basis of the Complaint.

# Objection No. 3

Page 1, lines 21-22 and Exhibit G to Motion for Summary Judgment. "The Church subsequently withdrew that notice. (A true and correct copy is appended hereto as Exhibit G.)" J.K. objects on foundational grounds to Ms. Fraser's statement that the Church withdrew its notice to vacate. Again, Ms. Fraser's declaration sets forth her personal knowledge to state that a legal letter was sent on behalf of Golden Era, by stating therein:

1. I make the following statements of my own personal knowledge and if called to testify thereto, could and would do so competently.

2. I am and have been an employee of the Church of Scientology International, Golden Era Productions division for more than 10 years. My responsibilities include corporate and legal matters for Golden Era Productions.

The Objection is frivolous, since J.K.'s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment makes the identical assertion of fact. (See Memorandum, Opposition to Summary Judgment, page 3, lines 12 ½ - 14.) Moreover, Ms. Fraser properly authenticates documents in this paragraph reflecting acts undertaken at her direction and control. "A writing may be authenticated by anyone who saw the writing made or executed, including a subscribing witness." Evidence Code §1413. Testimony from a percipient witness, speaking from personal knowledge as to the execution of a writing, is

sufficient. People v. Estrada (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 76, 100, 155 Cal.Rptr. 731.

# Objection No. 4

Page 1, lines 22-25 and Exhibit H to Motion for Summary Judgment. "However, J.K. took the position that the notice could not be withdrawn and demanded the property be vacated by November 5, 2006. (A true and correct copy of the letter from J.K.'s attorney to this effect is appended hereto as Exhibit H.)" J.K. asserts boilerplate foundation, hearsay, relevance and "settlement discussions" grounds to object to Ms. Fraser's statement that J.K. informed the Church that its notice to vacate could not be withdrawn and required that the property be vacated by November 5, 2006. However, this foundational fact is also alleged in the verified Complaint, at ¶7(b) so is obviously relevant. Ms. Fraser's statement is not hearsay, and a letter from a landlord demanding a tenant vacate a premises is hardly "settlement" discussions conceding an issue of liability. Indeed, if the 3 foregoing objections were sustained and the evidence of these events stricken, there would be no basis for the unlawful detainer complaint.

Ms. Fraser sets forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of her Declaration, sufficient personal knowledge to state that a letter was received by J.K. Properties, which she authenticates as Exhibit H to the Summary Judgment Motion.

# Objections No. 5 and 6

Declaration page 1, line 28 to page 2, line 8, and Exhibit I to Motion for Summary Judgment. "At my direction, an November 4, 2006, a representative of the Church, Linda Greilich, spoke by telephone with Pinkel Jogani, one of the principals of J.K., endeavoring to negotiate an extension of the lease. Arising out of that call, Ms. Greilich faxed a letter to Mr. Jogani on November 4, 2006, which stated: "Dear Mr. Jogani, this is to put in writing what we agreed per our phone conversation of today's date that we, Golden Era Productions, will give you 90 days notice to move out, and we will pay you 60 days bonus of rent when we move out." (A true and correct copy I caused to be sent

by Ms. Grielich is appended hereto as Exhibit 1.)" Ms. Fraser sets forth her personal knowledge of what she instructed her subordinate to do in calling J.K.'s principal Mr. Jogani, and to authenticate the resulting letter Ms. Fraser had her subordinate Ms. Greilich fax to Mr. Jogani. Testimony from a percipient witness, speaking from personal knowledge as to the execution of a writing, is sufficient. People v. Estrada (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 76, 100, 155 Cal.Rptr. 731.

The letter otherwise speaks for itself and is not hearsay. The call and letter are manifestly relevant, as they gave rise to the very document which J.K.'s principals assert is the basis for over \$100,000 of damages it claims. Indeed, these objections are exemplary of the make-work nature of these pointless objections, since the letter (SJ Motion, Exhibit I), from Ms. Greilich was also authenticated by J.K.'s president, Anil Mehta at his deposition. (The entirety of Anil Mehta's deposition with all exhibits is herewith lodged with the Court. See Page 4, identifying the letter as Exhibit A to deposition and page 17 at which Mr. Mehta authenticates the letter.) A writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity. *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395.

Obviously the exhibit is not "irrelevant", since it forms part of the basis for J.K.'s argument that it is entitled to an offset for what J.K. incorrectly asserts is a "contract."

# Objection No. 7

Page 2, lines 6-8 and Exhibit J to Motion for Summary Judgment. "On November 5, 2006, J.K.'s, attorney wrote and characterized the letter from Ms. Greilich not as an agreement, but as an "offer." (A true and correct copy is appended hereto as Exhibit J.)" <sup>1</sup> Ms. Fraser also properly authenticates this letter from J.K.'s agent which was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Note there is a typo in the description of the letter, as the date of the letter is November 6, 2006, not November 5, 2006. It is Exhibit J to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

received by her within the scope of her duties and within Ms. Fraser's personal knowledge, written to her counsel by J.K.'s counsel.

Moreover, J.K.'s president Anil Mehta authenticated the same letter at his deposition. (See description of letter listed at p. 4 as Exhibit B, and p. 21 of deposition at which he authenticates the letter.) A writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity. *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395.

# Objection No. 8

Declaration, page 2, lines 9-16, and Exhibit K to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
"In a further letter sent to Church counsel and forwarded to me from Mr. Bhatia, on November 14, 2006, he stated: "Please note that there is no agreement between the parties to date, including any discussion between the parties on November 5, 2006. 
Golden Era's letter does not bind my clients... Please be clear: there will be no agreement until both parties execute a written extension of the lease, after all terms have been resolved... Otherwise, please note that my clients will move forward on their unlawful detainer claim." (A true and correct copy is appended hereto as Exhibit Ex. K.)"

Ms. Fraser is competent to authenticate the letter received from J.K. which reflected the central issue in the case before the unlawful detainer was filed, and the letter from J.K. otherwise speaks for itself. Moreover, J.K.'s president Anil Mehta authenticated the same letter as Exhibit H. at page 30 of his deposition. A writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity. *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395.

J.K. is also estopped from objecting to these statements since J.K. has already acted upon these writings as "authentic," by filing its lawsuit herein on the basis of these very facts. *Evidence Code* Section 1414(b); *People v. Lynn* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715,

735. It is outrageous that J.K. would send a letter to the Church, produce it in discovery, and then object that its own letter is not authenticated.

# Objection No. 9

Declaration, p. 2, lines 17-21. "Meanwhile, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, however, such discussions failed to result in resolution of the case or agreement on an amended lease. No agreement was achieved, and no new lease or addendum to the existing lease was signed. Reaching no agreement on an extension of the lease..." Ms. Fraser is competent to assert the matters stated as the representative of the Church involved in these discussions. The fact of settlement discussions is not remotely barred by any rule of Evidence – only admissions of liability are barred. Nor is the statement "irrelevant," as it goes to the heart of a defense raised by J.K. for its failure to pay the security deposit.

# Objection No. 10

Declaration, p. 2, lines 21-23, and Exhibit N. "... on July 15, 2007, as a courtesy to plaintiff, I instructed counsel to give a new 30-day notice to J.K. Properties that it would be vacating the premises on August 15, 2007. (A true and correct copy is appended hereto as Exhibit N.)" Obviously Ms. Fraser is competent to testify as to the instructions she personally gave to counsel resulting in a letter she required to be sent to J.K. from counsel, and to authenticate the letter which was subsequently sent to J.K. Properties. Moreover, the letter, which gave a final 30-day notice it would leave the premises, is the centerpiece of J.K.'s argument that it should have 90 days rather than 30 days notice. As with other objections, this is disingenuous, make-work.

# Objection No. 11

Paragraph 10, page 2, line 26 - page 3, line 2, and Exhibit O. "Mr. Jones sent me a letter regarding the results of the walk-through, indicating "I must commend your

organization on the overall condition of the apartments. I found no damages to any of the apartments including the appliances that was not more than normal wear and tear." (A true and correct copy is attached as Ex. O.)

The assertion that testimony is "irrelevant" is outrageous. It forms the basis of the proof that the security deposit was required to be returned, and Ms. Fraser is competent to testify as to the receipt of the letter from J.K.'s agent to the effect that there was no damage to the property; and to authenticate such letter.

Moreover, Ms. Fraser declares she personally walked through the apartments with Mr. Jones to inspect them before CSI vacated them and that Mr. Jones personally sent her a letter. Witnesses may testify about things they have personally seen or heard or otherwise experienced through their own senses. Evidence Code Section 702. J.K. has offered no evidence to refute these facts.

Moreover, J.K.'s property manager William Jones also testified to the same effect and authenticated the letter at hand in his deposition. (A copy of Mr. Jones' deposition is herewith lodged with the Court, where he authenticates the letter he sent at pages 17-18, and the letter is marked as Exhibit B to the deposition.)

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# Objection No. 12

Declaration page 3, lines 4-5. "The Church pays Mr. Moxon's firm a reduced rate flat retainer fee of \$4,500 per week for his work, the hours of which vary from week to week." The sole objection to Ms. Fraser's testimony as to the funds paid to counsel is "irrelevant." Obviously it is relevant to the issue of attorneys fees for at issue in this case.

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# Objection No. 13

Declaration page 3, lines 5-6. "Mr. Moxon has set forth his hours in a separate declaration." The statement by Ms. Fraser simply points out that the specific attorney hours are in a separate declaration from counsel. This objection is pointless and inane.

# Objections to Moxon [First] Declaration Objection No. 14

Declaration, page 1, lines 7-9. "On at least 10 occasions, I communicated both in writing and orally with plaintiff's counsel in this case, pointing out the lack of merit of plaintiff's theories of recovery for the charges set forth in the "Final Statement of Account" and its attachment. "The statement at hand concerns the Church's many attempts to reason with J.K. over the unmeritorious and unsupportable positions J.K. was taking. It is highly relevant to the fees issue, and lack of good faith by J.K. It is not remotely a "settlement" discussion.

# Objection No. 15

Declaration page 1, lines 10-21. "The first such communication was a letter to counsel following receipt of plaintiff's position respecting monies claimed owed, on August 24, 2007. This lengthy letter set forth and refuted each of J.K.'s theories. (A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit1.)

3. Thereafter, on October 30, 2007, I wrote:

Your letter asserts a failure to pay "the sum owing" as to this property and states that you intend to amend the complaint to assert a fraud cause of action. I write again in an effort to resolve this matter and urge you to reconsider this highly inadvisable course of conduct.

I am setting forth the key points of the chronology here for your information in an effort to prevent the need to respond later to legal positions by your client which lack merit and which are based upon conclusions not warranted by the correct facts. "

Again, the statement at hand concerns the Church's many attempts to reason with J.K. over the unmeritorious and unsupportable positions J.K. was taking. It is relevant to the

fees issue, and lack of good faith by J.K. It is not remotely a "settlement" discussion. Nor is it hearsay - its sets forth personal knowledge of the speaker re-iterating his own prior statement not for the truth of the matter asserted, but that the statement was made.

# **Objection No. 16**

Declaration page 1, line 23- Page 2, line 2. "My letter thereafter set forth the essential facts addressed in the instant summary judgment motion. The letter concluded:

Given that your client has not sought to rent any of the other units it received last summer, the exemplary condition which the property was maintained by the Church, and that the Church is not in possession, there is no basis for damages in this case and thus no reason to continue any litigation and the unnecessary further expenditure of funds."

Again, the statement at hand concerns the Church's many attempts to reason with J.K. over the unmeritorious and unsupportable positions J.K. was taking. It is relevant to the fees issue, and lack of good faith by J.K. It is not remotely a "settlement" discussion. Nor is it hearsay - it sets forth personal knowledge of the speaker re-iterating his own prior statement not for the truth of the matter asserted, but that the statement was made.

# Objection No. 17, 18 and 19

Moxon Declaration, "Plaintiff and its counsel ignored the letter. I thereafter spoke to Mr. Jones about the issues in the case and offered to address any point he might wish to avoid further litigation, but he declined.

4. Attorney Mason Yost took over primary responsibility of the case for plaintiff thereafter, and indicated he intended to file an amended complaint addressing these same theories of recovery. I spoke to him about the lack of merit and contradictory nature of the plaintiff's theories by telephone, and then again during the several depositions of his clients. All of these efforts were unavailing.

5. Because of plaintiff's frivolous positions, I was required to take 4 depositions of present and former Anza Management Company employees and one of the principals of J.K. Properties to acquire the evidence set forth in the motion for summary judgment. Again, the statements from the Moxon Declaration concern the Church's many attempts to reason with J.K. and its counsel over the unmeritorious and unsupportable positions J.K. was taking, and to avoid the need for expenses and waste of time (such as the instant motion)."

These statements are relevant to the fees issue, and lack of good faith by J.K. The statements are not remotely a "settlement" discussion and concern no admission of liability. Nor are the statements hearsay - they set forth personal knowledge of the speaker re-iterating his own prior statement not for the truth of the matter asserted, but that the statement was made.

Objection No. 20

Declaration page 2, lines 4-19. "My client pays my firm a reduced rate flat retainer fee of \$4,500 per week for my work for it, which runs from no time some weeks to as much as 45 hours some other weeks, depending upon litigation circumstances. The average is 20 hours per week for such services, which equates to \$225 per hour on this reduced rate. However, I request my normal fee of \$300/hr as a reasonable fee for my work on this case, which is a low fee for my level of experience as a litigator in this community." The sole objection to the statement of hours expended and fees incurred is objected to as "irrelevant." It is both relevant and necessary to the Church's fees claim as a matter of law.

# Objection No. 22

Declaration page 3, lines 7-8. "The court reporter fees for the four depositions in this case, and the fees for the translator demanded by J.K. Properties' representative, cost \$ 3,574.24." This is simply the required statement of costs incurred by counsel for

1	deposition fees, which is also necessary for the fees and costs requested herein.		
2	Obviously it is relevant. Mr. Moxon swears to personal knowledge of the fees incurred.		
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4	Objection No. 23		
5	EXHIBIT C		
6	Deposition Testimony of Debra Berutich		
7	J.K. objects to the entirety of Ms. Berutich's deposition testimony on the boiler-		
8	plated grounds of relevance and "no lines noted." Both assertions are without merit. The		
9	Church provided J.K. an amended Statement of Material Facts immediately after the last		
10	hearing with all lines referenced for each deposition reference, and filed it with the Court.		
11	Lines on deposition pages are not an evidentiary requirement in any event, but were		
12	provided in a [failed] attempt to eliminate the issue from contention with J.K.		
13	Without the slightest hint of why the testimony by Ms. Berutich is allegedly		
14	"irrelevant," the Church will forbear from re-examining each of the issues for which the		
15	testimony was utilized in the memorandum. Ms. Berutich's testimony in general is		
16	directly relevant to the issues raised by both J.K.'s complaint and CSI's cross-complaint.		
17	At issue in this case are CSI's rental payments made, the inspection done after CSI moved		
18	out of the apartments and the state of the property at that time. Ms. Berutich was one of		
19	the persons directly handling those items, she was the superior of Mr. William Jones the		
20	property manager, she was responsible for accepting funds from tenants and she was a		
21	signatory to the final statement of account justifying why the security deposit was not		
22	returned. Each of these issues is relevant to the issues raised in the motion for summary		
23	judgment.		
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25	Objection No. 24		
26	Exhibit D		
27	Deposition Testimony of Anil Mehta		
28	J.K. objects to this deposition testimony on the same boiler-plated grounds of		

relevance and "no lines noted." <sup>2</sup> Both assertions are without merit. The Church provided J.K. an amended Statement of Material Facts immediately after the last hearing with all lines referenced for each deposition reference and filed it with the Court.

Mr. Mehta's testimony is directly relevant since he is the president of the plaintiff and cross-defendant in this action, J.K. Properties, and was personally involved in events giving rise to this action. His testimony goes directly to each of the issues raised in the Complaint, the Cross-claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment. All of his testimony is relevant and admissible.

# **Objection No. 25**

#### Exhibit E

# **Deposition Testimony of William Jones:**

J.K. objects to all of Mr. Jones' deposition testimony on the same boiler-plate grounds relevance and "no lines noted." CSI thus incorporates its same responses to J.K.'s objections made above. Mr. Jones was the regional manager in charge of the property at issue in this case. He was also the person who conducted the walk-through with Ms. Fraser at the time that CSI moved out of the apartments. Therefore, he is the most competent witness to discuss the highly relevant issues of damages to the property and proof to entitlement to return of the security deposit.

# Objection No. 26

#### **Exhibit F**

This objection is an example of make-work, boilerplate objections to all exhibits. The exhibit is a letter dated August 7, 2006 to J.K. and its agents giving notice that the Church would vacate the premises. Although J.K. objects, the letter is specifically identified in the verified unlawful detainer Complaint filed by J.K. (See paragraph 7.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> J.K. has deleted its frivolous and factually false objection that Mr. Mehta was not provided with an interpreter.

Indeed, this notice to vacate gave rise to J.K.'s Complaint.

It is also authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 5 and authenticated again for good measure in the Third Declaration of Kendrick Moxon, paragraph 7. It is not offered for the truth of the assertions therein, but that the letter was sent and it otherwise speaks for itself.

Objection No. 27

#### **Exhibit G**

This is a letter dated November 1, 2006 from Church counsel to J.K. and its agents, objected to on foundation and hearsay grounds. Although objected to here, the letter is referenced and relied upon in J.K.'s Opposition Memorandum, page 3, lines 11 ½ -14 without noting its date. The letter was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 5, and authenticated yet again in the Third Declaration of Kendrick Moxon, at paragraph 5. It is not offered for the truth of the assertions therein, but that the letter was sent and it otherwise speaks for itself.

# Objection No. 28

#### Exhibit H

This is a letter dated November 3, 2006 from J.K.'s counsel to Church counsel and its agents, objected to on foundation, settlement, relevance and hearsay grounds. The letter was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 5, and authenticated yet again in the Third Declaration of Kendrick Moxon, the original recipient of the letter at paragraph 6. It is not offered for the truth of the assertions therein, but that the letter was sent and it otherwise speaks for itself. The letter is relevant to the issues in the cross-complaint and the Motion for Summary Judgment, as a notice that J.K. rejected the effort to withdraw the notice to vacate, triggering the unlawful detainer action. It has nothing to do with the settlement rule, as it makes no admission of liability and does not concern settlement in any event.

# Objection No. 29

#### Exhibit I

This is a letter dated November 5, 2006 from Church representative Linda Greilich to J.K.'s agent, objected to on boilerplate relevance, hearsay, "settlement" and foundation. The letter was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 6. It was *also* authenticated by J.K.'s agent Anil Mehta as Exhibit A to his deposition, at page 17. See, *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395, (a writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity).

The letter forms the entire basis of the argument that there was a "contract" between the Church and J.K. giving rise to a defense that it need not return the security deposit. As a result, J.K. is estopped from objecting to these statements since J.K. has already acted upon these writings as "authentic," by filing its lawsuit herein on the basis of these very facts. *Evidence Code* Section 1414(b); *People v.* Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 735. The boilerplate objection is unjustifiable make-work.

## Objection No. 30

#### Exhibit J

This is a letter dated November 6, 2006 from J.K.'s counsel to Church counsel objected to on boilerplate relevance, hearsay, "settlement" and foundation.

The letter constitutes a critical document in these proceedings, rejecting the alleged "contract" from Linda Greilich upon which J.K. now claims there was an agreement justifying its refusal to return the security deposition. It is therefore quite relevant.

The letter was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 7. It was further authenticated in the Third Declaration of Kendrick Moxon, paragraph 7.

It was *also* authenticated by J.K.'s agent Anil Mehta as Exhibit B to his deposition, at page 21. See, *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395, (a writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is

offered has already admitted its authenticity).

The document makes no admission of liability triggering the settlement objection rule, and has nothing to do with settlement in any event.

# Objection No. 31

#### Exhibit K

This is a letter dated November 14, 2006 from J.K.'s counsel to Church counsel, objected to on boilerplate grounds of relevance, hearsay, "settlement" and foundation. The letter constitutes an refutation of J.K.'s present position that the letter from Ms. Greilich constituted an "agreement," by flatly stating that it did not, and resulting in the filing of the unlawful detainer case shortly thereafter.

The document was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 8, and in the Third Moxon Declaration at paragraph 8. It was *also* authenticated by J.K.'s agent Anil Mehta as Exhibit G to his deposition, at pages 28-30. *California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395, (a writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity). The letter speaks for itself and is not a "settlement" discussion.

Objection No. 32

#### Exhibit M

# J.K.'S Opposition To Demurrer

J.K. objects to its opposition to CSI's demurrer as "irrelevant." The opposite is true. J.K. has taken two different positions in this action. The first position, (as evidenced by its complaint) was (1) to have CSI immediately move out of its property and (2) an admission that, since the lease had expired, the tenancy had reverted to a month to month, a fact shown by J.K.'s opposition to CSI's demurrer.

J.K. also takes the conflicting position, that it is entitled to 90 days notice *during* the unlawful detainer action. Thus, Exhibit M has been presented to show that J.K.

admitted that the lease agreement had expired and that its agreement with CSI had reverted to a month to month tenancy which -- never, after 1998, required any more than 30-day notice to vacate. It was filed by J.K. and constitutes an admission by J.K.

## Objection No. 33

#### Exhibit N

This is a letter from Church counsel dated July 16, 2007 giving J.K. 30-day notice to vacate, objected to on the basis of relevance, hearsay, foundation. The letter was authenticated by Ms. Fraser in her declaration at paragraph 9 and again in the Moxon Declaration at paragraph 9 thereto. J.K. argues this specific 30-day notice was insufficient, thus asserting the significance of the letter notice at the same time it objects to introduction of the properly authenticated letter on relevance grounds.

J.K. is estopped from objecting to these statements since J.K. has already acted upon these writings as "authentic," by filing its lawsuit herein on the basis of these very facts.. Evidence Code Section 1414(b); People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 735, 206 Cal.Rptr. 181. See also, California Metal Enameling Co. v. Waddington (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 391, 395, 141 Cal.Rptr. 443 (a writing may be authenticated by evidence that the party against whom it is offered has already admitted its authenticity).

The relevance and hearsay objections are pointless, boilerplate make-work.

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# Objection No. 34

#### **Exhibit O**

This letter from J.K.'s agent William Jones notes the lack of any damages to the property, and was authenticated by Ms. Fraser who received the letter.

It was also authenticated by Mr. Jones himself in his deposition at page 17, and by J.K.'s agent Ms. Berutich at Ex. E, p. 57. "A writing may be authenticated by anyone who saw the writing made or executed, including a subscribing witness." Evidence Code § 1413. Testimony from a percipient witness, speaking from personal knowledge as to the

J.K. also asserts that this Court's Reporter's signature on the transcript lacks sufficient foundation. Other than to say the objection is frivolous, we're speechless on that one.

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#### Objection No. 38

#### Third Declaration of Kendrick Moxon

This declaration was submitted prior to the filing of J.K's amended objections to eliminate any further evidentiary disputes of foundation as to the exhibits at issue. As such foundation could have been provided as late as the hearing itself, the authenticating declaration was timely filed – particularly given the fact that J.K. withdrew its prior objections and filed entirely new objections thereafter.

### Objection No. 39

# **Revised Separate Statement**

Following the prior hearing at which the Court asked Mr. Jones to amend his objections, Mr. Jones originated to counsel that he felt there should be line numbers referencing each deposition reference. As an accommodation, a revised Separate Statement of Material Facts was provided to him and the Court which did just that – added line numbers for the benefit of the Court and J.K. Although completely revising Objection, J.K. objects that the Revised Statement is filed late and is "irrelevant." It is neither. Such numbers could have been provided at the time of the hearing and are solely an accommodation to J.K., the Court and to clarify the record herein.

# Objection No. 40

#### Second Declaration of Kendrick Moxon

The Second Moxon Declaration, filed February 9, 2009, simply updated the fees request as of the day before the hearing on this matter on February 10, 2009, stating hours fees which obviously could not have been known before they were expended. It is not late. It is relevant and appropriate and could even be filed after the hearing.

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1	Dated: March 3, 2009	Respectfully submitted,
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4		MOXON & KOBRIN Kendrick L Moxon
5		John A. Boyd THOMPSON & COLEGATE
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7 8		Attorneys for Defendant CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
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PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. On March 3, 2009, I served the foregoing document described as: RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-DEFENDANT, J.K. PROPERTIES, INC.'S **AMENDED** OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE by personal service on interested parties in this action as follows: **Kevin Jones** 2016 Riverside Drive Second Floor Los Angeles, CA 90039 Executed on March 3, 2009 at Los Angeles, California. I declare in accordance with the laws of the State of California under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.